So it turns out Boston (possibly the first in the area, but dont quote me) is using CAI Data Registration, which is similar to a trunked talkgroup. Radio turns on and lands on P25 Conventional channel and sends a reg packet which is acknowledged by the server running data services. When the radio logs out it sends a logout packet. All of this is based on the radio being in range of the system, the system hearing the radio and the radio hearing the system. All this data can be correlated to see what subscribers are on and off and what channel they are on.Only Trunked systems use Affiliation (similar to your Cellphone - registering with the network)
P25 Conventional has no control channels for registration
Yes AES, industry standard now, no one should be using ADP or DES. And of course OTAR/OTAP.That makes sense. I'd imagine Boston is probably using AES-256. An agency of their size (~2000 officers with 1+ portables, others with portable access, and God knows how many mobile radios) they would have to engage in the Over-the-air-Rekeying (OTAR). It would be near impossible to interface with every single radio however often they wish to change their encryption key as recommended, or when they changed it in the first place.
So it turns out Boston (possibly the first in the area, but dont quote me) is using CAI Data Registration, which is similar to a trunked talkgroup. Radio turns on and lands on P25 Conventional channel and sends a reg packet which is acknowledged by the server running data services. When the radio logs out it sends a logout packet. All of this is based on the radio being in range of the system, the system hearing the radio and the radio hearing the system. All this data can be correlated to see what subscribers are on and off and what channel they are on.
Yes AES, industry standard now, no one should be using ADP or DES. And of course OTAR/OTAP.
That explains all the quick burst transmissions that I've observed on the channels.So it turns out Boston (possibly the first in the area, but dont quote me) is using CAI Data Registration, which is similar to a trunked talkgroup. Radio turns on and lands on P25 Conventional channel and sends a reg packet which is acknowledged by the server running data services. When the radio logs out it sends a logout packet. All of this is based on the radio being in range of the system, the system hearing the radio and the radio hearing the system. All this data can be correlated to see what subscribers are on and off and what channel they are on.
I'm not saying they share thier keys I'm saying they suggest that folks use AES encription for more security and larger departments who often work with them on task forces and day to day operations are more likely to take thier suggestions then smaller departments that often do what cost less.Scott, I don't disagree that surveillance ops and the like should be encrypted. I'm sure you're well aware of who I'm talking about, and I'd love to make another point but that would be getting too close to the line.
That being said, John, you're telling me that the Feds use new encryption keys or share theirs with locals for an Op?
Interesting. I see something similar on the MV P25 conventional frequencies. 155.4375 and 156.2175 both display this. Don't want to detract from this thread. I'll have to have a closer look at that.That explains all the quick burst transmissions that I've observed on the channels.
It's in RR as being in the clear.I beleive Ohio State Patrol is as well.
It appears that New Jersey SP can be added to this list soon, if I can read between the dreck of this RR thread properly: https://forums.radioreference.com/threads/njsp-patrol-encryption.492899/So ressurecting one thing in this thread. I took a few minutes from my lunch break tonight to look at the different state highway patrols. (Known as State Police, Highway Patrol, Department of Safety, you get the idea). To see how many of those have gone encrypted. Now I am listing these based on primary channels only. What you can or can't hear
If a state patrol has two dispatches, one in the clear, one encrypted, I haven't listed that. These are 100% unmonitorable
Alaska
Delaware
Florida
Georgia (Not monitorable. Except for Atlanta troop area)
Michigan - District 2 (Detroit)
Montana - District 4, 7
North Dakota
Pennsylvania
Virginia
So that is 7 out of 50, plus the Michigan and Montana selected troops.